Int roduction
The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Project, funded by the World Health Organization (WHO), tries to quantify the global burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors on human population. In order to estimate the disease burden, the WHOdeveloped a summary measure of population health known as Disability-Adjusted Life-Year (DALY). The DALY estimates the health gap of a population in the form of lost years of healthy life due to either disability/morbidity or premature death.
Disability weights were originally calculated using Rating Scale (RS) valuations [4] . However, the valuation protocol was completely changed in 1995, and the RS was replaced by the Person Trade-Off (PTO) method. Apparently the reason had to do with the idea that disability weights should encapsulate not only individual utilities but also a broader set of societal values. In such a way DALYs would be a better instrument to inform resource allocation decisions [5] . As it is claimed that the PTO can encapsulate social preferences [6] it was the method finally chosen. .
In recent years, however, some of participants in the GBD Project have called the use of the PTO into question. Murray and colleagues have argued that DALYs were deviced as a Summary Measure of Population Health (SMPH) and their "dominant objective" is to measure the health of populations (the burden of disease) (cfr., Murray and Frenk [7] , p.10). They separate out the issue of measurement from the potential applications of SMPH. According to them (Murray et al, [2] , pp. 14-15) SMPH can be used to compare the health of populations, to monitor changes in the health of a given population… and to inform debates on priority setting. Resource allocation is just one potential use of SMPH. It is now suggested that the design of SMPH ha s been too closely linked with the issue of resource allocation and this has led to construct SMPH on the basis on methods like the PTO which "bring us far from the common-sense statement that one population is healthier than another" (Murray et al., [2] , p. 23).
In order to compare the health of populations Murray et al. [2] tentatively propose a method based on an application of the Harsanyi's principle of choice from behind a 'veil of ignorance ' [p.24] . Specifically, Murray et al. [2] proposed that "the relation 'is healthier than' can be defined such that population A is healthier than population B if and only if an individual behind a veil of ignorance would prefer to be one of the existing individuals in population A rather than an existing individual in population B, holding all non-health characteristics of the two populations to be the same" (p. 24).
Although Murray et al. have not proposed explicitly to use the veil of ignorance (VEI) approach in order to value health states it seems reasonable to think that this is a logical follow-up of their proposal. Nord ([3] , p. 142) suggests a straightforward way of applying the veil of ignorance approach to the valuation of health states. We transcribe literally his proposal:
Suppose one wants to obtain a disability weight for severe asthma, subjects can then be faced with two hypothetical cohorts, A and B, of 100 people each (Table 1) :
Each subject can then be asked: Behind a veil of ignorance, to which cohort would you rather belong? One can then change the number of asthma cases until the subject is indifferent. If the median indifference number in an appropriate sample of subjects is in fact 20, the disability weight for asthma will be 5:20 = 0.25. This operationalization may be seen either as a variant of the person trade-off technique or as a probability trade-off resembling the standard gamble technique (Menzel 1990; Nord 1999 ). Whether it should be seen as the former or the latter depends on the considerations that people take into account when they respond.
Nord raises an important question, namely, if people take into consideration equity concerns then the veil of ignorance approach will not overcome the problem that Murray et al. wanted to avoid, and preferences should be seen as a mixture of individual and societal value judgement (which is called by Menzel [8] a Self&Other perspective and by Dolan et al. [9] socially inclusive personal preferences). The existence of this ambivalence (i.e., mixed preferences vs personal preferences) with respect to the actual meaning of VEI values motivates our paper. This paper tries to test if the approach suggested by Murray et al in order to measure the health of populations produces results closer to individual or to social values when it is applied to the valuation of health states.
Elicitation techniques
In order to conduct this test the VEI approach has to be compared with the PTO and with a method that only encapsulates individual values. To that end, we conducted a survey amongst the general population (N=300) asking VEI questions using the operationalization of Murray et al.'s proposal suggested by Nord [3] . Respondents were also interviewed using the conventional PTO method and a variant of the SG proposed by McCord and de Neufville [10] that they called the "lottery equivalent" (LE) method.
In this method individuals are asked to set the indifference between two gambles by varying the probability of one of them. In order to emphasize the common root of SG and LE (i.e., in both cases indifference is reached by varying probability), in this paper we will refer to LE as Double Gamble (DG). In summary, the main hypothesis of this paper will be tested by comparing VEI, DG and PTO approaches.
We think that the traditional SG is not a proper method in order to examine if the VEI approach is closer to individual or social values. The SG may incorporate some biases that can be a confunding factor in the interpretation of results. If subjects interpret VEI questions as expected utility maximizers, the operationalization suggested by Nord [3] can be seen as a comparison between two risky lotteries with no sure outcome in any of the two. By contrast, in the SG there is one degenerate lottery (i.e., the probability of a particular outcome is 1). It is commonly assumed that the SG is affected by the so-called 'certainty effect' [11] . This elicitation bias implies that the degenerate lottery in the SG is overweighed, leading to high utilities [12] . Some authors have proposed that the certainty effect can be avoided by the DG method [13] . The second objective of the paper is to study the potential influence of the certainty effect to explain the difference between VEI and other valuation techniques.
Finally, it could be hypothesized that PTO and VEI produce different values because the PTO may be affected by the so-called 'Rule of Rescue' (RoR) which would not influence VEI. The term RoR was coined by Jonsen [14] In sum, preferences in our study were elicited using four methods, namely: DG, PTO, VEI, and the classical SG. The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) was also included at the beginning of the surveys to familiarize subjects with the health states to be valued.
Framing of questions is shown in Appendix A.
We used a multi-step procedure in order to reach indifferences with all methods.
Appendix B depicts the application of this procedure for the specific case of the DG method. As it can be seen there, the two first questions (Choices 1 and 2) allow us to discriminate between those respondents who regard the health state as better-than or worse-than death. Next, we present a table with multiple choices, and for each choice the chances of one of the two gambles are varied, until the indifference is reached. The estimation of quality weights at the indifference point for each method is outlined in Appendix C.
Design and methods

HEALTH STATES
We calculated quality weights for five health states (henceforth they are denoted as Q, R, X, Y, and Z) representative of the loss of quality of life after stroke (see Table   2 . )
The instrument used to describe health states was the Modified Rankin Scale ( [17] , [18] ). This instrument yields an ordinal ranking of severity, according to which the five health states can be logically ordered from better to worse as follows: Q f R f X f Y f Z, where the preference relation f means "preferred to".
STUDY DESIGN
Two stratified random samples (stratified on age and gender) were drawn from the general population from the Barcelona area using random-digit-dialing to recruit people willing to participate in a face-to-face interview in their home. A team of 6 trained interviewers conducted the interviews over a 2 month period. Respondents were not compensated for participating. In order to test the reliability of the methods, 50 subjects were again interviewed two weeks later. 12 Euros were offered as monetary compensation for accepting to be interviewed for a second time. About 50% rejected the payment. Table 3 summarizes our study design. One survey (henceforth, survey 1) included questions with non-traditional methods (i.e., DG, PTO, and VEI), while the other survey (survey 2) included conventional SG questions. Health states and questions were randomized in the two surveys, with the exception of VAS questions that were always presented at the beginning of the questionnaire. Respondents in survey 2 only valued three health states (R, X, and Y), so comparisons of the non-traditional methods with the SG are limited to these three health states.
In order not to overburden the respondents we splitted the total sample of survey 1 into two sub-samples of equal size. Each sub-sample completed all the tasks, i.e., the methods administered, for three of the five health states under evaluation. With this design we expected to conduct interviews not too long. In addition, this design allows performing between-subject tests of consistency. It has the advantage of making more difficult that respondents can perceive the ordinal logic of questions, avoiding strategic behavioural forcing consistency.
[TABLE 3]
When death was not present in questions (denoted ü*), quality weights were then estimated in two different ways. First, as we explained in Section 2, we used a chained procedure. In this way, table 2 shows that the weight of health state R was estimated both with (sub-sample 1) and without (sub-sample 2) chaining. Hence, for the sake of clarity, from now on we will identify with R2 the case in which the weight of R was estimated in a standard way (using death as the worst reference health state) and with R1 the case in which the weight of R was chained to death throughout health state X.
Equally, health state Q was chained to death by mean of the anchor health state R2.
Second, as we also explained in Section 2, the influence of the RoR was tested by removing death of the scale on which quality weights were computed. In consequence, we also estimated weights for Q and R1 by setting values for R2 and X, respectively, equal to 0. We will only report the results of the two tests separately if they yield different conclusions.
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to test for differences between independent samples. In this way we compared SG weights (survey 2) with VEI and DG weights (survey 1) respectively. Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple significance testing was considered if appropriate.
We also assessed various psychometric properties (i.e., feasibility, reliability and consistency) of the VEI approach in relation to PTO and DG methods. These properties have been largely studied for traditional methods like the SG [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] but there is little evidence for the PTO [31] and it is unknown for the DG.
Test-retest reliability was estimated by mean of Spearman's rank coefficients.
Feasibility was examined by computing the percentage of complete responses. Finally, logical consistency, i.e., the extent to which the health states used in the study was rank- using the same non-parametric methods described above.
Results
RESPONDENTS
Survey 1 was administered to 300 respondents. There was no statistically significant difference between sub-sample 1 (N 1 =150) and sub-sample 2 (N 2 =150) in any sociodemographic characteristic (i.e., age, gender, education level, and employment status). Mean age was around 48 years in sub-sample 1 and 47 years in sub-sample 2.
Proportions of women were slightly higher than men in both sub-samples. Most people had elementary or secondary educational degree, and the majority of them were emplo yed at the time of the interview. Interviews lasted approximately 50 minutes on average. Survey 2 was administered to 100 respondents. Both surveys were alike demographically, but there was a difference in employment status (Chi-square, P<0.05).
The percentage of employed was 88% in sur vey 2, while it did not exceed 73% in survey 1.
PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES
All subjects were able to fully complete all tasks. Thus, the completion rate among the respondents was 100%. It seems that the VEI approach is highly feasible when it is conducted in a face-to-face interview.
Test-retest reliability was also satisfactory. Spearman rank correlation coefficients were larger than 0.9 for all methods considered (P<0.01 in all comparisons).
The highest correlation was found for the DG method, reaching the unity, whereas in the case of VEI was 0.943. The lowest coefficient was for the PTO (0.928).
We also tested the logical consistency of the three methods. Comparisons between all pairs of health states within each of the sub-samples were significant (P < 0.001) and they went in the direction we expected (i.e., R1 f X f Z for sub-sample 1, and Q f R2 f Y for sub-sample 2). Once we found that consistency was satisfied within each sub-sample and method, we then test whether such a consistency also hold between the two sub-samples. Again, all the comparisons were significant (MannWhitney U test, 0.001 < P < 0.05) with the exception of R1 and R2. In summary, we found that the rank-order of health states followed the logical order that we expected, Table 4 displays the median (and the interquartile range) for each health state across the four methods tested (DG, PTO, VEI and SG) plus the VAS.
COMPARISONS OF METHODS
[ As it can be seen, respondents were ordinally consistent in the initial VAS task (Wilcoxon test, P < 0.001). We found significant differences between PTO, VEI and DG (Friedman test, P < 0.0001). We then examined the differences between each pair of methods.
[ TABLE 5 ]
The picture that seems to emerge from inspection of table 5 is:
First, the PTO clearly differs from the rest of the methods, since it generates significant higher values. In consequence, it seems that preferences elicited by VEI and PTO methods are different.
Second, DG and VEI valuations were quite similar. It seems that respondents behave as expected utility maximizers to evaluate VEI questions. For health state R1, the difference between DG and VEI is significant at the 5% level by the Wilcoxon test (P = 0.021) but it is not significant by the Nemenyi test.
Third, the SG produced higher utilities than VEI and DG (Mann-Whitney test, P < 0.001 for states R2 and X, and P < 0.01 for state Y). This result seems to support our hypothesis of the influence of the certainty effect. It also suggests that in order to test the relation between VEI and methods based on self-interest the SG does not seem the appropriate comparator.
As we explained in previous sections, we also computed quality weights for health states Q and R1 by setting equal to 0 the value of health states used as bottom endpoints in elicitations (states R2 and X respectively). We observe that even though death is removed from weights calculations, significant differences between VEI and PTO persist. Median value for Q was 0.51 for VEI and 0.63 for PTO (P < 0.05). In the case of state R1 the median was 0.5 for VEI and 0.81 for the PTO (P < 0.05). The tendency observed in the rest of health states, namely, that PTO weights are higher than VEI ones, clearly remains in spite of the absence of death. It seems that the difference between the PTO and the VEI is not only due to the rule of rescue (as we defined it).
This overall picture that the PTO seems to produce values that are different from VEI and DG values is reinforced if we analyse preferences for health states in relation to death for health states Y an Z (in the rest of health states the number of people that considered those states as worse than death was quite small).
[ In summary, the PTO values seem to be quite different from VEI and DG values. One of the reasons seems to be the RoR but it does not seem to be only reason.
Conclusion
The veil of ignorance approach proposed by Murray et al. [1, 2] , using the operationalization suggested by Nord [3] , seems closer to individual utilities than to This does not mean, however, that VEI weights can be seen as conventional standard gamble utilities. Our data suggest that the VEI is not affected by the 'certainty effect', but it is closer to a 'double gamble' method originally devised to avoid the probability distortion caused by the classical standard gamble technique. In all these examples the veil of ignorance approach would coincide with a commonsense notion of population health. For example, if in society A infant mortality is lower than in society B, we all would agree (common-sense) that health in A is better than in B. A SMPH should show that health in A is higher than in B. A SMPH based on the veil of ignorance approach would show that health in A is better than in B. The reason is that any person, behind a veil of ignorance, would prefer to be a member of the population with the lower mortality rate. In this way the VEI approach can be used as a basis for constructing SMPH consonant with any of the dimensions described by Murray et al. It is not apparent that the DG method can be used on a similar basis.
It also seems that our findings about the relation between VEI and PTO cannot be entirely due to the effect of the 'Rule of Rescue', at least as this rule has been understood along this paper. Differences between both methods remain when death is not present. Of course, the RoR could be understood in more general terms as a tendency to help those who are worse-off. Our results for the PTO could then be interpreted as being influenced by the RoR in all cases.
Other papers have used the veil of ignorance perspective in order to analyze several health care issues (see Nord [32] p. 43-47 for a review and comment). However there is only one (Richardson and Nord [15] ) with a similar perspective to ours.
Richardson and Nord used a "personalized" version of the PTO (that they called PTOself) that incorporates the veil of ignorance perspective. The PTO-self questions explicitly invited respondents to have in mind their own interests when they made their choices. The effect of the change of perspective (from impersonal to personal) resulted in higher values for the PTO-self than for the PTO. This result seems to contradict ours.
We believe that there are, at least, two explanations for this discrepancy.
The first explanation is that both framings seem to be quite different. Simply, there may be various possible operationalisations of the 'veil of ignorance' approach, such as Menzel [8] assumes to differentiate between PTO-Self and PTO-Self&Other questions. Indeed, this is also emphasized by Nord [3] when he suggests that "to avoid ambiguities and difficulties of interpretation, the veil of ignorance approach therefore needs some further specification" (p. 143). However, the present study seems to show that personal preferences may be captured by the VEI approach even without asking individuals to think only on their own self-interest
The second explanation is that the results obtained by Richardson and Nord are in some respect surprising. It is true that they find that the PTO-self produces higher values than the PTO however it is also true that in the same paper the Time Trade-Off utilities are also higher than the PTO. However, PTO values are commonly found higher than individual based utilities [33] [34] [35] . Then one possible explanation of the result that PTO-self is higher than PTO is that, for some unknown reason, in their paper PTO values are too low.
We think that the change in preferences in front of death is an interesting result because it illustrates quite clearly a potential criticism to the PTO, namely, "paternalism". We understand by paternalism to impose preferences for others that we personally do not hold, "this is bad for me but good for you". This question is quite problematic and it is related to the issue of perspective in preference elicitation that has been discussed in other papers [9] [36] . What this paper shows is that the kind of considerations that people seem to take into account when responding to PTO questions are very different from the considerations they use under the VEI approach.
This study has also found that acceptability, reliability and consistency are good enough for the different methods used in this paper. This is relevant since, to the best of our knowledge, such features have not been examined before neither for the DG nor for the VEI using a representative sample of the general population, and, in the case of the PTO, the revision of the empirical evidence available is considered "inconclusive", "relatively unknown", or even, "virtually non-existent" ( [15] ).
One potential limitation of our study is that the results can be too dependent on the framing we have used. This is suggested by the opposite results obtained by After the choice was explained, respondents were asked whether they preferred the high dose, the low dose, or whether they were indifferent between the two treatments. In case a respondent preferred either the high dose or the low dose, next choice was displayed:
Step 2 Now when a respondent preferred the low dose the interviewer determined through a sequence of choices (
Step 3) probabilities of success and failure until indifference was reached:
Step 3 Finally, suppose that the respondent chose the high dose when probability of success was 15%. Hence, the indifference probability would be lower than 15%.
The same multi-step procedure was used for the remaining methods, i.e., PTO, SG, and VEI..
Appendix C: Estimation of quality weights
I. METHODS USED IN SURVEY 1
• In the VAS method, the respondent is asked to place health states to be evaluated plus death on a line with 100 (best imaginable health state) and 0 (worst imaginable health state) as endpoints, such that the distance between the placements correspond to differences in preferences. If death is judged to be the worst state and placed at the 0 endpoint of the scale, the weight for each of the other health states is the scale value of its placement divided by 100. If death is not judged to be the worst state and it is placed at some intermediate point on the line (say d), the weights for the remaining states are obtained as
where i is the scale placement of the health state to be evaluated.
WITHOUT CHAINING
• In the DG method, the high dose alternative is a gamble with a chance p of good health and a chance (1-p) of dead. The low dose alternative is a gamble with a chance q of good health and a chance (1-q) of the health state to be evaluated (say I). The respondent is then asked to choose one of the two doses. At the indifference point, the weight for health state I is:
by assuming the usual conventions W(good health) = 1 and W(dead) = 0.
• In the PTO method, Program A is a new treatment that cures a certain number r of patients suffering the health state to be evaluated. Program B is a new medicine that cure a certain number s of patients who are about to die. The respondent is then asked to choose one of the two programs. At the indifference point, the weight for health state I is:
• In the VEI method, Society A has h members in good health and t members who are about to die. Society B has v members in good health and w members in the state to be evaluated. The respondent is then asked to choose one of the two societies. At the indifference point, the weight for health state I is:
WITH CHAINING
• In the chained DG method, the respondent is asked to choose between a gamble with a chance p' of good health and a chance (1-p') of state J, and a gamble with a chance q' of good health and a chance (1-q') of the health state to be evaluated (state I). At the indifference point, the weight for health state I is:
where W(J) is estimated according to formula (1).
• In the chained PTO method, t he respondent is asked to choose between a program that cures people suffering the anchor state J and a program that cures people in the state to be evaluated. We have then
where W(J) is estimated according to formula (2).
• In the chained VEI method, the respondent is asked to choose between a society with v members in good health and w members in the state to be evaluated, and a society with h members in good health and t members in the anchor state J. Thus we have
where W(J) is estimated according to formula (3).
II. METHODS USED IN SURVEY 2 (STANDARD GAMBLE)
• If the health state to be evaluated (I) is regarded by the respondent as better than death, then the SG method offers the two following alternatives: a gamble (high dose alternative) with a chance p of good health and a chance (1-p) of dead, and health state I with certainty (low dose alternative). The respondent is then asked to choose one of the two doses. At the indifference point, the weight for health state I is:
• If the health state to be evaluated (I) is regarded by the respondent as worse than death, then the SG method offers the two following alternatives: a gamble (low dose alternative) with a chance q of good health and a chance (1-q) of health state I, and immediate death with certainty (no dose). The respondent is then asked to choose one of the two doses. At the indifference point, the weight for health state I is:
TABLES AND FIGURES The person has symptoms as a result of a health problem; symptoms can include numbness, minor problems with movement, or some difficulty with reading or writing. The symptoms do not interfere with the person's usual activities to any appreciable extent, but they may affect the person's enjoyment of aspects of their daily life.
Health state R
As a consequence of the health problem the person is restricted in participation in a major aspect of life that they engaged in previously. They may be unable to work or look after children if these were major roles before; they may have restricted social and leisure activities; or they may have experienced significant disruption of close relationships. They can look after their own affairs (preparing meals, household chores, shopping in the neighbourhood, looking after their financial situation…) and can attend to their bodily needs (such as washing, going to the toilet, and eating) without problems.
Health state X
As a consequence of their health problem the person is unable to live independently. They will be unable to travel alone or shop without help if they did these things previously; and they will be unable to look after themselves at home for some reason (for example they may not be able to prepare a meal, do household chores, or look after money). They can attend to their bodily needs (such as washing, going to the toilet, and eating) without problems.
Health state Y
As a consequence of their health problem the person needs assistance with some basic activities of daily living or needs help from another person with walking. Basic activities of daily living include attending to bodily needs such as washing, going to the toilet, and eating.
Health state Z
As a consequence of the health problem the person is bedridden, and unable to move from bed without assistance. They may be incontinent, and will need someone available at all times to look after them. 
